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Abstract
Abstract argumentation has emerged as a method for non-monotonic reasoning that
has gained tremendous traction in the symbolic artificial intelligence community. In the
literature, the different approaches to abstract argumentation that were refined over the
years are typically evaluated from a logics perspective; an analysis that is based on mod-
els of ideal, rational decision-making does not exist. In this paper, we close this gap by
analyzing abstract argumentation from the perspective of the rational man paradigm in
microeconomic theory. To assess under which conditions abstract argumentation-based
choice functions can be considered economically rational, we define a new argumentation
principle that ensures compliance with the rational man’s reference independence prop-
erty, which stipulates that a rational agent’s preferences over two choice options should
not be influenced by the absence or presence of additional options. We show that the
argumentation semantics as proposed in Dung’s classical paper, as well as all of a range
of other semantics we evaluate do not fulfill this newly created principle. Consequently,
we investigate how structural properties of argumentation frameworks impact the refer-
ence independence principle, and propose a restriction to argumentation expansions that
allows all of the evaluated semantics to fulfill the requirements for economically rational
argumentation-based choice. For this purpose, we define the rational man’s expansion
as a normal and non-cyclic expansion. Finally, we put reference independence into the
context of preference-based argumentation and show that for this argumentation variant,
which explicitly model preferences, the rational man’s expansion cannot ensure reference
independence.
1. Introduction
Argumentation has been studied as a tool for persuasion and reasoning since antiquity.
In recent decades, a large body of research emerged on argumentation as a method to
instill intelligence, i.e. reasoning capabilities, into computing systems, in particular into
autonomous agents. In this context, a popular theory for formal argumentation is so-called
abstract argumentation, as initially developed by Dung (Dung, 1995), which is frequently
used as the foundation of research on formal argumentation and hence spawned a variety of
frameworks that extend the initial work (Baroni, Caminada, & Giacomin, 2018). Abstract
argumentation is considered (see, e.g., Rahwan and Simari (Rahwan & Simari, 2009)) a step
towards Leibniz’s vision of the unambiguous resolution of disagreements through mathemat-
ical means–the axiomization of argumentation:
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If “controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation;
[it would suffice to say:] let us calculate” (Russell, 1938, p. 170).
A key aspect of abstract argumentation research is the definition and evaluation of
different argumentation semantics. An argumentation semantics is a definition of how a
graph of arguments–an argumentation framework–should be resolved, i.e. which arguments
can be considered accepted and which cannot. Considering the variety of argumentation
semantics (which determine how argumentation frameworks are to be resolved), as well
as the range of advanced frameworks that aim to augment Dung’s basic definition of an
argumentation framework, it is not clear how such a “controversy” is to be resolved in the
sense of Leibniz and consequently what the result of a calculation process for argument
resolution should be.
From the perspective economic theory, a classical model of choice is the notion of the
rational man (see, e.g., Rubinstein (Rubinstein, 1998)). While the rational man as a suffi-
ciently precise model of human decision-making has been debunked by a body of empirical
research (Kahneman, 2003), it can still be considered relevant, for example for prescrip-
tive modeling of an ideal agent that strictly optimizes according to clear preferences when
determining its choices. Aligning abstract argumentation with the rational man paradigm
requires, as this paper shows, the introduction of a new argumentation principle–an ax-
iomatic requirement to an argumentation semantics (van der Torre & Vesic, 2017)–that
Dung-style argumentation semantics typically do not fulfill. In contrast, applying argu-
mentation semantics that do not guarantee rational behavior can lead to boundedly rational
behavior that reflects human decision-making fallacies (see, e.g., Kahneman (Kahneman,
2003)).
In this paper, we use a novel1 formal approach to explore the intersection of abstract
argumentation and (bounded) economic rationality and show that abstract argumentation
can lead to economically not rational choice processes.
Let us provide an example that illustrates the problem this paper focusses on. An agent
A1 uses abstract argumentation for choosing a subset A∗ from a set {a, b}. For this, the
agent constructs the attack relation (a, b), i.e. a attacks b. Given the set of attack relations
{(a, b)}, the arguments {a, b} are typically resolved as {a}. Let us refer to the constructed
argumentation framework as AF . The agent’s choice of {a} implies that the agent prefers
choosing {a} over all other possible options: {a}  {a, b}, {a}  {b}, {a}  {}. Now, let us
assume that a second agent A2 consults A1 to consider a third item c, i.e. the set to choose
from is now {a, b, c}. A2 also recommends to A1 to add the attack relations (b, c) and (c, a).
Given the attack relations {(a, b)(b, c), (c, a)}, many argumentation semantics resolve the
arguments {a, b, c} as {}. Let us refer to the constructed argumentation framework as AF ′.
If A1 were to adopt the recommended attack relations, this implies that it now prefers {}
1. While Caminada introduces rationality postulates for abstract argumentation semantics (Caminada,
2019), his work focuses on rationality from a logics perspective, i.e., on properties of argumentation
semantics in regards to specific argumentation frameworks, without considering the expansions of any
argumentation framework. Also, let us note that an application of the rational man’s argumentation
principles we establish in this work to Amgoud’s and Cayrol’s preference-based argumentation is provided
in Section 9.
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Figure 1: Inconsistent preferences: AF implies {a} is preferred over {}, while AF ′ implies
{} is preferred over {a}.
over all elements 6= {} in 2{a,b,c}, which in turn implies {}  {a}. This is inconsistent with
the preference {a}  {} that A1 has given the set {a, b} (see Figure 1). In this case, A1
can be considered to behave economically irrationally. The phenomenon that the presence
of additional choice options changes existing preferences–in this case {a}  {} to {}  {a}
is called reference dependence. It is interesting to see that this change in preferences can be
achieved without adding direct attack relations between arguments in AF ; i.e. AF ′ can be
referred to as a normal expansion of AF . Hence, A2 can attempt to deceiveA1 into changing
its preferences without noticing. From the perspective of economic rationality, the existence
of the defeated argument c should not change the preferences A1 has already established
given the arguments {a, b}. Indeed, such a change of preferences can be problematic in
practice. For example, when an intelligent system needs to determine a set of actions,
choosing {a} given {a, b}, while choosing {} given {a, b, c} does typically not make sense,
ceteris paribus. Figure 1 depicts the argumentation graphs of AF and AF ′.
To address the problem of reference dependence in abstract argumentation, this paper
provides the following contributions:
1. Firstly, it characterizes the concept of reference independence in the context of argu-
mentation semantics and argumentation framework expansions.
2. Secondly, it proofs that well-established argumentation semantics cannot guarantee
reference independence for normal argumentation framework expansions.
3. Thirdly, it proofs that argumentation that is based on normal, non-cyclic expansions–
which we refer to as rational man’s expansions– guarantees reference independence.
4. Finally, it puts reference independence and rational man’s expansions in the context
of preference-based argumentation, an argumentation approach that explicitly mod-
els agent preferences. This shows that reference dependence is also a problem for
preference-based argumentation, which can, however, in this case not be solved with
the rational man’s expansion that this paper introduces.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 grounds this paper in the con-
text of research traditions at the intersection of economics and artificial intelligence, whereas
Section 3 provides an overview of abstract argumentation frameworks, semantics and prin-
ciples, and of (bounded) rationality. Then, Section 4 presents argumentation frameworks
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in the context of choice functions for economic decision-making. Section 5 establishes the
argumentation principles the rational man paradigm requires. Hereby, the new rational
man’s reference independence principle is defined, based on which Section 6 shows that
typically, argumentation semantics do not guarantee a rational choice process. To still
allow for abstract argumentation in accordance with the rational man paradigm, a new
argumentation framework expansion that helps guarantee economic rationality is defined in
Section 7. Subsequently, Section 8 provides examples of how our concept of rational man’s
argumentation expansions can be applied in different argumentation-based choice scenar-
ios. Finally, Section 9 shows that the rational man’s expansion is also useful in the context
of preference-based argumentation, before Section 10 concludes the paper by highlighting
relevant future work.
2. Economic Rationality and Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence frequently draws from concepts that have first been established in
economic theory. For example, the notions of utility functions and preferences that are
central to many models and algorithms of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems stem
from ideas of the philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Sen,
1991). Von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s ground-breaking game theoretical work Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann, Morgenstern, & Kuhn, 2007) influenced
generations of both economics and artificial intelligence researchers. More recently, the
works of Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler, who both have received the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economic Sciences for their research on behavioral economics, have inspired new
work on and discussions about ethics and responsibility in artificial intelligence (Dignum,
Baldoni, Baroglio, Caon, Chatila, Dennis, Ge´nova, Haim, Kließ, Lopez-Sanchez, Micalizio,
Pavo´n, Slavkovik, Smakman, van Steenbergen, Tedeschi, van der Torre, Villata, & de Wildt,
2018).
A key concept at the intersection of economics and artificial intelligence is the notion of
economic rationality. In the same way that a rational economic decision-maker–traditionally
a human agent–is ideally expected to act according to clear and consistent preferences (Ru-
binstein, 1998, p. 7 et sqq.), artificially intelligent agents should “maximize [their] perfor-
mance measure” as stated in the definition of a rational agent by Russel and Norvig (Russell
& Norvig, 2016, p. 37). The concept of economical rationality is reflected in many ground-
breaking works on economics, such as the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950), and Tversky’s
and Kahneman’s empirical work on the limits of human agents to act rationally in the
economic sense (Kahneman, 2003).
An important property in the context of economic rationality is reference independence:
a decision-maker’s preferences over a set of items S should not be affected by the pres-
ence, or absence, of additional items S+. The negation of reference independence–reference
dependence–as established as a theory by Tversky and Kahneman (Tversky, Slovic, & Kah-
neman, 1990) and empirically validated as a phenomenon in human decision-making by,
e.g., Bateman et al. (Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1997), stipulates that
an agent might change their initial preference a  b out of the set of possible choices A,
with a, b ∈ A to b  a, depending on reference points that are either added to the choice
set itself or provided as additional context, but that do not impact the value or quality of
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either a or b. As a real-world example, let us summarize a study by Doyle et al. (Doyle,
O’Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999). In a grocery store, two brands of baked beans x
and y are sold. x and y are sold in cans of the same size. Although x is cheaper than y,
only 19% of bean sales are of brand x. By adding a new option x′–a smaller can of beans
by brand x that is sold at the same prize as the original can x–the share of x increases to
33% of total sales (while sales of x′ are negligible).
From the body of research we summarize above it is clear that human decision-making
is often not reference independent. However, reference independence can typically be con-
sidered a desired property of the decision-making process of artificially intelligent agents,
as we have demonstrated above, in the example that is visualized by Figure 1. Yet, when
evaluating artificially intelligence systems, economic rationality in general, and reference
dependence in particular, is typically not considered. Instead, research results are com-
monly evaluated based on traditional performance criteria like accuracy and computational
complexity. In this context, a group of well-established artificial intelligence researchers
advocates for a paradigm shift in the evaluation of “machine behavior” (Rahwan, Cebrian,
Obradovich, Bongard, Bonnefon, Breazeal, Crandall, Christakis, ..., & Wellman, 2019) that
can be considered a continuation of the cross-disciplinary work of Herbert Simon, who ini-
tially coined the term bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). In the spirit of Simon, but also
of Kahneman, who uses empirical methods to systematically specify the boundaries of hu-
man rationality, this paper presents an application of the study of economic rationality to
the area of formal argumentation. As we study–in contrast to Kahneman–formally specified
frameworks and not humans, we are able to use formal methods in our evaluations. Thereby,
our focus lies on an artificial intelligence method that can, as described above, be traced to
the ideas of Leibniz, and that should, as a tool to objectively resolve disagreements, ideally
reflect the principles of rational economic decision-making.
3. Theoretical Background
This section introduces the foundations upon which this paper builds: the rational man
paradigm in economic theory and abstract argumentation frameworks, in particular argu-
mentation semantics and principles.
3.1 The Rational Economic Man Paradigm
As a prerequisite, we introduce a definition of a partially ordered set (Davey & Priestly,
2002).
Definition 1. Let Q be a set. An order (or partial order) on Q is a binary relation  on
Q such that, for all x, y, z ∈ Q:
1. x  x (reflexivity);
2. x  y and y  x imply x = y (antisymmetry);
3. x  y and y  z imply x  z (transitivity).
We refer to a set Q that is equipped with an order relation  as an ordered set (or partial
ordered set) and denote it by (Q,). In economic theory, the model of a rational deci-
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{c, s}
{c} {s}
{}
Figure 2: Example: a graphical representation of a choice set, in which the following prefer-
ence relations of the rational man hold: ∀A′ ∈ {{coffee}, {snack}, {}} : {coffee, snack} 
A′ (a  b is visualized by a→ b). Note that the preference graph is not an argumentation
framework, as indicated by the different style of arrows.
sion maker–the rational economic man paradigm2–can be described as follows (based on a
definition by Rubinstein (Rubinstein, 1998, p. 7 et sqq.))3.
Definition 2 (Rational Economic Man). Given a set of choice options A, the rational
economic man determines his choice of elements A∗ ⊂ A according to his preference order
(partial order)  so that ∀A′ ∈ 2A : A∗  A′; i.e., A∗ is the rational man’s preferred option
when compared to all possible alternatives.
For example, given the choice set {coffee, snack}, the rational man’s preferred op-
tion could be {coffee, snack}, given he chooses this element from the set 2{coffee,snack}.
The choice implies ∀A′ ∈ {{coffee}, {snack}, {}} : {coffee, snack}  A′, as depicted in
Figure 2.
In the context of this paper, an important property of the rational man’s choice process
is reference independence.
Definition 3 (Reference Independence). Given a set of choice options A and any two
possible subsets of choice options A1 ⊆ A and A2 ⊆ A, with A1 ⊆ A2 and the rational
man’s choices A∗1 ⊆ A1 (based on the choice options A1) and A∗2 ⊆ A2, if A∗2 ⊆ A1, then
A∗2 = A∗14.
Colloquially expressed, the rational man’s choice outcome is not affected if options that
the agent does not prefer over the “previously” existing options are added to the set of
potential choices.
2. In this paper, we often use the shortened term rational man.
3. However, in contrast to the model used by Rubinstein, we use a choice model that allows for choosing
any subset A∗ ⊂ A of the set of choice options A instead of exactly one option (x∗ ∈ A)
4. A proof of this property for the “chose one” variant of the model is provided by Rubinstein (Rubinstein,
1998, p. 11)
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Example 1. If a decision-maker, given the set {tee, cookie} chooses {tee} and given the
set {tee, cookie, coffee} chooses {tee, cookie} the choice is not rational; the presence of the
“new” irrelevant alternatives {coffee}, {tee, coffee}, {cookie, coffee}, and {tee, cookie,
coffee} causes the preference relation {tee}  {tee, cookie} to change to {tee, cookie} 
{tee}.
The reference independence property implies that the expansion of a choice set A1 to
A2 ⊃ A1 does not add new knowledge about the elements in A1 that affects the decision-
maker’s preferences over elements in 2A1 . Yet, in reality, human decision-makers can use
the addition of options to a choice set as a way to infer new information about the quality of
the original choice options, as for example shown by Doyle et al. (Doyle et al., 1999). Still,
in the context of computational argumentation-based choice, it can be useful to be able to
distinguish between changes in choice options and outcomes that comply with the reference
independence property and those that do not. For example, in a consultation scenario, a
consulted agent may want to check if the consulting agent is providing a proposal that is
seemingly barely adding new choice options, but covertly also altering the preferences over
existing choice options. Such a scenario is presented in greater detail in Section 8.
3.2 Abstract Argumentation
To allow for a concise overview of the relevant foundations of abstract argumentation, we
introduce a formal definition of the basic structure of an argumentation framework (AF),
provide the definitions of well-established argumentation semantics, and explain the notion
of argumentation expansions and principles.
Definition 4 (Argumentation Framework). (Dung, 1995) An argumentation framework
is a pair AF := (AR,Attacks), where AR is a finite set of arguments, and Attacks is a
binary relation on AR, i.e. Attacks ⊆ AR×AR.
In the context of an argumentation framework, a attacks b means that
attacks(a, b) holds. Similarly, a set S attacks b if b is attacked by an argument in S, and c
defends b if a attacks b and c attacks a.
To select coherent sets of arguments from an argumentation framework, Dung introduces
the notion of conflict-free, acceptable, and admissible sets.
Definition 5 (Conflict-free, Acceptable, and Admissible Arguments). (Dung, 1995)
• Conflict-free. A set of arguments S is conflict-free iff there are no arguments a, b
in S such that a attacks b.
• Acceptable. Given an argumentation framework AR, an argument a ∈ AR is ac-
ceptable w.r.t. an argument set S iff for each argument b ∈ AR: if b attacks a, then
b is attacked by S.
• Admissible. A conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible iff each argument in S
is acceptable with regards to S.
7
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Based on these concepts, Dung (and others) define different semantics for resolving
argumentation frameworks.
Definition 6 (Argumentation Semantics). (Dung, 1995) An argumentation semantics σ
is a function that takes an argumentation framework AF = (AR, attacks) and returns a set
of sets of arguments denoted by σ(AF ).
σ : AF → 22AR ,
with AF denoting the set of all possible argumentation frameworks. Each set of σ(AF ) is
called a σ-extension.
Below, we provide an overview of semantics/extensions that are commonly applied and
analyzed by the formal argumentation community. In the context of this paper, we use the
colloquial umbrella term well-established semantics to refer to the semantics introduced in
Definition 75.
Definition 7 (Argumentation Extensions). (Dung, 1995; Dung, Mancarella, & Toni, 2007;
Caminada, Carnielli, & Dunne, 2012; Caminada, 2007; Verheij, 1996; Baroni et al., 2018)
Given an argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks), an admissible argument set S ⊆
AR is a:
• stable extension (σstable) of AF iff S attacks each argument that does not belong to
S.
• preferred extension (σpreferred) of AF iff S is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion)
admissible set of AF .
• complete extension (σcomplete) of AF iff each argument that is acceptable w.r.t. S
belongs to S.
• grounded extension (σgrounded) of AF iff S attacks each argument that does not
belong to S.
• ideal extension (σideal) of AF iff S is contained in every preferred extension of AF .
• semi-stable extension (σsemi−stable) of AF iff S is a complete extension where
S ∪ S+ is maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion), with S+ := {b|∃a ∈ AR : (a, b) ∈ Attacks}.
• eager extension (σeager) of AF iff S is the greatest (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible
set that is a subset of each semi-stable extension.
Given an argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks), a conflict-free argument set S ⊆
AR is a stage extension (σstage) of AF , iff S is conflict-free and S ∪ S+ is maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion), with S+ := {b|∃a ∈ AR : (a, b) ∈ Attacks}.
5. This does not mean that in general, other semantics cannot be considered as well-established.
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To introduce the definitions of stage2 and CF2 semantics, let us first define the notion
of strongly connected components as follows. “Strongly connected components (SCCS) pro-
vide a unique partition of a directed graph into disjoint parts where all nodes are mutually
reachable” (Baroni et al., 2018). In the context of an argumentation framework AF , the
set of strongly connected components of AF is denoted by SCCSAF . For example, the
graph of the argumentation framework ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, a), (b, c)}) has the SCCS {a, b}
and {c}.
Definition 8 (CF2 Extensions). (Baroni et al., 2018) Given an argumentation framework
AF = (AR,Attacks), a set of arguments S ⊆ AR is an extension of CF2 semantics (σCF2)
iff:
• if |SCCSAF | = 1, S is a maximal conflict-free extension of AF
• otherwise, ∀Args ∈ SCSSAF (S ∩Args) ∈ σCF2(AF ↓UPAF (Args,S)) , with
AF ↓UPAF (Args,S)= (UP, S ∩ UP × UP ), the restriction of AF to UP (Baroni, Gia-
comin, & Guida, 2005) and for any S,Args ⊂ AR,UPAF (Args, S) = {a ∈ Args|@b ∈
S
Args : (b, a) ∈ Attacks}.
Definition 9 (Stage2 Extensions). (Baroni et al., 2018) Given an argumentation frame-
work AF = (AR,Attacks), a set of arguments S ⊆ AR is an extensions of stage2 semantics
(σstage2), iff:
• if |SCCSAF | = 1, S is a stage extension of AF ;
• otherwise ∀Args ∈ SCCSAF (S ∩Args) ∈ σstage2(AF ↓UPAF (Args,S)) otherwise, with
AF ↓UPAF (Args,S)= (UP, S ∩ UP × UP ), the restriction of AF to UP (Baroni et al.,
2005) and for any S,Args ⊂ AR,UPAF (Args, S) = {a ∈ Args|@b ∈ S
Args : (b, a) ∈ Attacks}.
In words, CF2 and stage2 semantics decomposition an argumentation framework into
SCCS and recursively resolve the framework component by component, starting with the
SCCS that are not attacked by any other SCC. Note that a detailed explanation of CF2
and stage2 semantics is beyond the scope of the paper.
Finally, we provide the established definitions for credulous and skeptical acceptance
of arguments (Doutre & Mengin, 2004), given a specific argumentation semantics and in
addition introduce the concept of lenient acceptance to allow for more concise formal work.
Definition 10 (Credulous, Skeptical, and Lenient Acceptance). (Doutre & Mengin, 2004)
• Credulous Acceptance. Given an argumentation framework
AF = (AR,Attacks) and an argumentation semantics σx, an argument a ∈ AR is
credulously accepted w.r.t. σx iff it is contained in at least one of the extensions of
σx(AF ).
9
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• Skeptical Acceptance. Given an argumentation framework
AF = (AR,Attacks) and an argumentation semantics σx, an argument a ∈ AR is
skeptically accepted iff it is contained in all of the extensions of σx(AF ). The skeptical
extension of an argumentation framework AF is the intersection of all extensions
σx(AF ) ( a.i., σ
∩
x (AF ) :=
⋂
E∈σx(AF )E).
• Lenient Acceptance. Given an argumentation framework
AF = (AR,Attacks) and an argumentation semantics σx, the lenient extension of
AF is the union of all extensions σx(AF ) ( a.i., σ
∪
x (AF ) :=
⋃
E∈σx(AF )E).
Let us note that the extensions returned by lenient semantics are not necessarily conflict-
free.
Given the variety of argumentation semantics that have been established throughout the
years, it can be challenging to assess which semantics are suitable for a specific application.
Consequently, argumentation principles have been established; evaluating the compliance
with one or multiple principles can guide the assessment of argumentation semantics in the
context of a specific use case. For example, a principle can specify that an argumentation
semantics should prescribe exactly one extension for any argumentation framework. An
overview of argumentation principles is provided by van der Torre and Vesic (van der Torre
& Vesic, 2017).
3.3 Argumentation Expansions
To describe a specific type of relation between two argumentation frameworks, the notion of
an argumentation framework expansion has been introduced by Baumann and Brewka (Bau-
mann & Brewka, 2010). A concise introduction and overview of expansions is presented by
Baumann and Woltran (Baumann & Woltran, 2016). The general concept of an argumen-
tation framework expansion can be defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Argumentation Framework Expansion). An argumentation framework AF ′
is an expansion of an argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks) (AF E AF ′) iff
AF ′ = (AR ∪AR′, Attacks ∪Attacks′), where AR′ ∩AR = Attacks′ ∩Attacks = ∅.
Several expansion types have been defined in the literature. In the context of this paper,
the notion of a normal expansion is of relevance.
Definition 12 (Normal Expansion). An expansion AF ′ of an argumentation framework
AF is normal (AF N AF ′) iff ∀a, b : ((a, b) ∈ Attacks′ → a ∈ AR′ ∨ b ∈ AR′).
In words, a normal expansion of an argumentation framework adds additional arguments
to the framework that can attack and be attacked by any other argument but does neither
remove existing arguments nor change attack relations (neither add nor remove) between
existing arguments.
4. Rational Argumentation-based Choice Function
In this section, we define the concept of economically rational argumentation-based choice
functions and, in this context, provide a brief overview of the difference between the rational
man paradigm’s reference independence requirement and monotonicity.
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4.1 Rational Argumentation-based Choice
To build the foundation for exploring the intersection of abstract argumentation seman-
tics and (bounded) rationality, we introduce the notion of an argumentation-based choice
function.
Definition 13 (Argumentation-based Choice Function). The argumentation-based choice
function g ◦ σ of an agent is the function composition between a function g and an argu-
mentation semantics σ that takes an argumentation framework as its input and returns a
set of decision outcomes AR∗ ⊆ AR:
g ◦ σ : AF → 2AR
To determine the function’s input, an economically rational agent needs to construct an
argumentation framework AF that consists of the propositional atoms–called arguments–
AR and a set of binary attack relations between those arguments Attacks ⊂ AR×AR. The
framework is resolved by an argumentation semantics σ; different argumentation semantics
can be used. In the context of rational economic choice, the mapping from a semantics’
output (a set of sets) to the choice function’s output requires that the semantics returns
always exactly one extension. If this is the case, the choice function can be defined in
different ways, for instance:
1. g∪ ◦ σ(AF ) = ⋃E∈σ(AF )E. If a semantics σ returns more than one extension, the
choice function g∪ ◦ σ(AF ) = ⋃E∈σ(AF )E returns the union of the set of extensions
returned by σ. We call such a function a lenient choice function.
2. g∩◦σ(AF ) = ⋂E∈σ(AF )E . If a semantics σ returns more than one extension the choice
function g∩ ◦ σ(AF ) = ⋂E∈σ(AF )E returns the intersection of the set of extensions
returned by σ. We call such a function a skeptical choice function.
However, for the purpose of evaluating argumentation semantics, it makes sense to define
the aggregation of extensions as part of the semantics itself, for example as follows:
1. gi ◦ σ∪stage(AF ) returns the lenient stage extension of AF .
2. gi ◦ σ∩stage(AF ) returns the skeptical stage extension of AF .
3. gi ◦ σ∩grounded(AF ) and gi ◦ σ∪grounded(AF ) return the grounded extension of
AF . There is always exactly one grounded extension, from which it follows that
gi ◦ σ∩grounded(AF ) = gi ◦ σ∪grounded(AF ). The same applies to ideal and eager
semantics.
For this, we characterize gi as the identity function:
gi ◦ σ(AF ) = σ(AF )
It is important to note that argumentation-based choice does not necessarily imply choice
from a set of goods or indeed any type of scenario that is typical for economic decision-
making examples, but can cover any decision-making process, for example the selection of
epistemic arguments from an argumentation framework that an agent will consider as valid.
11
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Example 2. As an example, let us consider the choice process of a family that wants to pur-
chase a car. The local car dealer has a limited selection of cars AR = {volvo, polo, porsche}.
As the family prefers a safe car with reasonable purchase and maintenance costs, the attacks
can be specified as Attacks = {(volvo, polo), (volvo, porsche), (polo, porsche)}, which gives
us the following argumentation framework AF :
AF = (
{volvo, polo, porsche},
{(volvo, polo), (volvo, porsche), (polo, porsche)})
Solving the framework, using–for example–complete semantics, returns {{volvo}}. Con-
sequently, given skeptical complete semantics σ∩c , the argumentation-based choice func-
tion gi ◦ σ∩c (AF ) returns {volvo}, which implies (given an economically rational family)
∀A ∈ 2{volvo,polo,porsche} : {volvo}  A; even if presented with a choice from a larger set
AR′ ⊃ AR these preferences need to hold.
Example 3. As a slightly more complex example, let us consider the choice process of a
person who considers buying a beverage in a cafe´. The cafe´ only offers tea and coffee: AR =
{tea, coffee}. The person prefers the caffeine kick of coffee, but also acknowledges the health
advantages of tea: Attacks = {(coffee, tea), (tea, coffee)}. Complete semantics σc resolve
the resulting framework AF = (AR,Attacks) as {{tea}, {coffee}, {}}. An argumentation-
based choice function gi ◦ σ∪c based on lenient complete semantics σ∪c flattens this set of
sets by determining the union of the complete extensions {coffee, tea)}, implying ∀A ∈
2{tea,coffee} : {coffee, tea}  A. In contrast, gi ◦ σ∩c , which is based on skeptical complete
semantics, returns {}, implying ∀A ∈ 2{tea,coffee} : {}  A.
Let us now put argumentation-based choice functions in the context of economic ratio-
nality. By considering Definition 2, we define the clear preferences property for argumentation-
based choice.
Definition 14 (Clear Preferences for Argumentation-based Choice).
Let AF = (AR,Attacks) be an argumentation framework and g ◦σ an argumentation-based
choice function. An argumentation-based choice A∗ = g ◦ σ(AF ) is economically rational
iff it holds that ∀A ∈ 2AR, A∗  A.
In words, the agent’s choice A∗ from 2AR means that the agent prefers A∗ over any of
the other sets in 2AR.
The clear preferences principle is obvious when evaluating a one-off argumentation-
based choice. However, when considering an argumentation process or dialog, during which
arguments and attacks are added to an argumentation framework over time, it is clear that
we need to consider the reference independence property as introduced in Definition 3. We
proof that, analogous to the economic principles, reference dependence is implied by the
clear preferences property in the context of argumentation-based choice.
Proposition 1 (Reference Independence for Argumentation-based Choice).
Let AF = (AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) be two argumentation frameworks for
which it holds that AR ⊆ AR′ and let g ◦ σ be an argumentation-based choice function. An
economically rational argumentation-based choice A∗ = g◦σ(AF ) implies that if g◦σ(AF ′) ⊆
AR, then g ◦ σ(AF ′) = g ◦ σ(AF ).
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Proof. By contradiction, we prove that g ◦ σ(AF ) = g ◦ σ(AF ′) given that:
• AF = (AR,Attacks),
• AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′),
• AF ⊆ AF ′,
• g ◦ σ(AF ′) ⊆ AR.
Let us suppose that g ◦ σ(AF ) 6= g ◦ σ(AF ′). =⇒ g ◦ σ(AF ) 6⊆ g ◦ σ(AF ′) ∨ g ◦ σ(AF ′) 6⊆
g ◦ σ(AF ).
1. If g ◦ σ(AF ) 6⊆ g ◦ σ(AF ′): ∃Arg ∈ g ◦ σ(AF ) ∧Arg 6∈ g ◦ σ(AF ′).
=⇒ i) g ◦ σ(AF )→ ∃A∗ ∈ 2AR ∧ ∀A ∈ 2AR/A∗ : A∗  A ∧Arg ∈ A∗,
ii) g ◦ σ(AF ′)→ ∃A′∗ ∈ 2AR ∧ ∀A ∈ 2AR/A′∗ : A′∗  A ∧Arg 6∈ A′∗.
=⇒ i) contradicts ii).
2. If g ◦ σ(AF ′) 6⊆ g ◦ σ(AF ): ∃Arg ∈ g ◦ σ(AF ′) ∧Arg 6∈ g ◦ σ(AF ).
=⇒ i) g ◦ σ(AF )→ ∃A∗ ∈ 2AR ∧ ∀A ∈ 2AR/A∗ : A∗  A ∧Arg 6∈ A∗,
ii) g ◦ σ(AF ′)→ ∃A′∗ ∈ 2AR ∧ ∀A ∈ 2AR/A′∗ : A′∗  A ∧Arg ∈ A′∗.
=⇒ i) contradicts ii).
In words, given a choice A∗ from 2AR that implies ∀A ∈ 2AR : A∗  A, no choice A′
from 2AR
′
with AR′ ⊇ AR should change the preferences implied by A∗.
4.2 Rationality and Monotonicity
Considering that abstract argumentation is a method for non-monotonic reasoning, and
given that the reference independence property may seem–at first glance–to imply mono-
tonicity, let us provide an intuition for distinguishing between the two concepts in the
context of argumentation-based choice. Given a set to choose from AR and a choice A∗
as a subset of AR, the choice implies ∀A ∈ 2AR : A∗  A. The reference independence
property requires that for all AR′ ⊇ AR the choice A∗′ ⊇ AR complies with the preference
relation implied by A∗; i.e. A∗′ = A∗ ∨ A∗′ 6⊆ AR. In contrast, monotonicity requires that
if the choice process determines a set A∗ ⊆ AR, given the possible choices 2AR, the choice
A∗ needs to be a subset of the choice set A∗′ ⊆ AR′ (AR′ ⊇ AR), given the possible choices
2AR
′
.
For example, given the sets AR = {a1, a2} and AR′ = {a1, a2, a3}, the reference inde-
pendence property is maintained, given the following choice result of an agent i:
• Given AR, i chooses {a1}, i.e. i prefers {a1} over all other possible choices ({a1} 
{a2}, {a1}  {a1, a2}, {a1}  {}).
• Given AR′, i chooses {a3}, i.e., i prefers {a3} over all other possible outcomes (∀A ∈
2{a1,a2,a3} : {a3}  A).
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Because the agent retracts its decision that {a1} is in the chosen set, its choice process is
non-monotonic. However, only if the agent were to retract its preferences, e.g., by deciding
that, given AR′, {a2}  {a1}, the reference independence property of the rational man
paradigm would be infringed.
5. Argumentation Principles for the Rational Man
From the two rational man properties that we established in the context of argumentation-
based choice, we derive two principles that an argumentation semantics σ needs to fulfill
to guarantee rational argumentation-based choice, given a choice function g ◦ σ. The first
principle is necessary to fulfill the rational man’s clear preferences property.
Definition 15 (Clear Preferences Principle). An argumentation semantics σ fulfills the
clear preferences principle, iff for any argumentation framework AF = (AR, aAtacks) the
following applies:
∀AF ∈ AF : |g ◦ σ(AF )| = 1
It is clear that all of the argumentation semantics introduced by Definitions 7, 8, and 9
with the exception of stable semantics, which–as shown by Dung–do not return any exten-
sion for some argumentation frameworks (Dung, 1995), fulfill the clear preferences principle,
given a lenient choice function g∪ ◦ σ(AF ) or a skeptical choice function g∩ ◦ σ(AF ).
Example 4. For example, given the argumentation framework
AF = ({a, b}, {(a, a)}), a skeptical choice function based on stable semantics g∩ ◦ σstable
returns no result, which implies the decision-maker does not have clear preference A∗, with
∀A ∈ 2{a,b} : A∗  A. In contrast skeptical choice functions based on other semantics could
return {b}, which implies A∗ = {b}  {a, b}, {b}  {a}, and {b}  {}.
Note that an overview of semantics that fulfill the clear preferences principle without the
need of an aggregating choice function g∩ or g∪ (by returning always exactly one extension)
is provided in the Appendix.
The second principle is necessary to fulfill the rational man’s reference independence
property.
Definition 16 (Reference Independence Principle). An argumentation semantics σ ful-
fills the reference independence principle iff for any two argumentation frameworks AF =
(AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′), with AF N AF ′ the following applies, given
an argumentation-based choice function g ◦ σ:
g ◦ σ(AF ′) ⊆ AR =⇒ g ◦ σ(AF ′) = g ◦ σ(AF )
To illustrate the principle, let us introduce an example.
Example 5. We have the following argumentation frameworks:
1. AF1 = (AR1, Attacks1) = ({a, b}, {(a, b)})
2. AF2 = (AR2, Attacks2) = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)})
Note that AF1 N AF2. Now, we apply complete semantics σ∩complete6 to both frameworks.
6. In this case, the aggregation as skeptical (∩) returns the same results as a lenient aggregation (∪). Also,
many other semantics return the same set of arguments in this case.
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1. gi ◦ σ∩complete(AF1) = {a}, which implies ∀Args ∈ 2{a,b} : {a}  Args.
2. gi ◦ σ∩complete(AF2) = {}, which implies ∀Args ∈ 2{a,b,c} : {}  Args.
gi ◦σ∩complete(AF ′) ⊂ AR and gi ◦σ∩complete(AF ′) 6= gi ◦σ∩complete(AF ); i.e., the choices of {a}
given {a, b} and {} given {a, b, c} are not rational, because the preference orders they imply
are inconsistent: gi ◦ σ∩complete(AF1) → {a}  {}, whereas gi ◦ σ∩complete(AF2) → {}  {a}.
Hence, it is clear that the argumentation semantics do not fulfill the reference independence
principle.
Note that the principle applies by definition only to normal expansions of a framework
(AF N AF ′). We introduced this restriction because it is obvious that any expansion AF ′
of AF = (AR,Attacks) with AF 6N AF ′ that adds attack relations between arguments
is revising the assumptions about framework AF and hence is clearly only suitable for
economically rational choice if a belief revision w.r.t. AF takes place. However, one could
define the additional principle strict reference independence that does not assume AF N
AF ′, which then requires the introduction of AF N AF ′ as a necessary condition to enable
rational choice. In any case, this distinction has little effect on the approach taken in this
paper.
6. Reference Dependence in Abstract Argumentation
As shown above, most argumentation semantics can be considered compliant with the ra-
tional man’s clear preferences property when only considering the resolution of a specific
argumentation framework, at least if they are skeptically (σ∩(AF )) or leniently (σ∪(AF ))
aggregated. However, we can provide simple examples that proof non-compliance with the
reference independence principle for complete, preferred, semi-stable, stage, stage2, and
CF2 semantics (lenient and skeptical), as well as grounded, ideal and eager semantics; i.e.,
these argumentation semantics do not guarantee clear preferences in the context of dynamic
argumentation processes or dialogues. These observations are formalized by the following
propositions.
Proposition 2. Let AF = (AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) be two argumentation
frameworks for which it holds that AF N AF ′. For all gi◦σyx, with x ∈ {complete, grounded,
preferred, ideal, semi− stable, eager} and y ∈ {∩,∪}, the following statement holds true:
gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) = gi ◦ σyx(AF )
Proof. We provide a proof by contra-example. Let us introduce the following argumentation
frameworks:
• AF = (AR,Attacks) = ({a, b}, {(a, b)});
• AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}).
We can see that AF N AF ′. The argumentation frameworks are resolved as follows:
• gi ◦ σyx(AF ) = {a}.
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• gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) = {}.
It follows that gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR and gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6= gi ◦ σyx(AF ). Consequently, it is clear
that gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) = gi ◦ σyx(AF ).
Proposition 3. Let AF = (AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) be two argumentation
frameworks for which it holds that AF N AF ′. For all gi◦σ∩x , with x ∈ {stage, stage2, CF2}
the following holds true:
gi ◦ σ∩x (AF ′) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σ∩x (AF ′) = gi ◦ σ∩x (AF )
Proof. To provide a proof by contra-example, let us again introduce the following argumen-
tation frameworks:
• AF = (AR,Attacks) = ({a, b}, {(a, b)});
• AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}).
We can see that AF N AF ′. The argumentation frameworks are resolved as follows:
• gi ◦ σ∩x (AF ) = {a}.
• gi ◦ σcapx (AF ′) = {}.
It follows that gi ◦ σcapx (AF ′) ⊆ AR and gi ◦ σcapx (AF ′) 6= gi ◦ σcapx (AF ). Consequently, it is
clear that gi ◦ σcapx (AF ′) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σcapx (AF ′) = gi ◦ σcapx (AF ).
Note that the proof of Proposition 3 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 at large.
In words, given AR, {a} is preferred over {} and given AR′, {} is preferred over {a}. Hence,
the semantics do not comply with the reference independence principle; adding an element
c to the set of elements {a, b} can affect the preference an agent has over elements in 2{a,b}.
Figure 1 depicts the argumentation graphs of the example frameworks used in the proofs
of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
By using a different example, we can prove that lenient stage semantics, lenient stage2
semantics, and lenient CF2 semantics do not comply with the reference independence prin-
ciple, either.
Proposition 4. Let AF and AF ′ be argumentation frameworks, with AF = (AR,Attacks),
AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′), and AF N AF ′. Let gi ◦ σ∪x be any argumentation-based choice
function with x ∈ {stage, stage2, CF2}. The following holds true:
gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) = gi ◦ σ∪x (AF )
Proof. We provide a proof by contra-example and introduce the following argumentation
frameworks:
• AF = (AR,Attacks) = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b)});
• AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′)
= ({a, b, c, d, e}, {(a, b), (b, d), (d, c), (c, e), (e, a), (d, d), (e, e)}).
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a
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(a) AF .
a
b
c
d
e
(b) AF ′
Figure 3: Reference dependence: AF implies {a, c} is preferred over {a, b, c}, while AF ′
implies {a, b, c} is preferred over {a, c}.
We can see that AF N AF ′. Any σ∪x , x ∈ {stage, stage2, CF2} resolves the frameworks
as follows:
1. gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ) = {a, b, c}.
2. gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) = {a, c}.
From gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR and gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6= gi ◦ σyx(AF ) it follows that gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) ⊆
AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) = gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ).
Figure 3 depicts the argumentation frameworks that are used in the proof above. We
can see that gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ) = {a, c} implies ∀Args ∈ AR : {a, c}  Args, and in particular
{a, c}  {a, b, c}, which is inconsistent with gi ◦σ∪x (AF ′) = {a, b, c}, which implies ∀Args ∈
AR : {a, b, c}  Args, and in particular {a, b, c}  {a, c}.
7. An Expansion to Ensure Reference Independence
In the previous section we have shown that none of the evaluated semantics comply with the
rational man’s argumentation principles–even when considering lenient semantics7. Hence,
the results presented in Section 6 indicate that in order to guarantee economic rational-
ity, and in particular reference independence, it is relevant to look beyond argumentation
semantics. At first glance, it is striking that the example expansions in the proofs of Propo-
sitions 2, 3, and 4 add new cycles to the argumentation graphs. Consequently, we examine
if an argumentation framework expansion can be defined that can guarantee compliance
with the rational man’s argumentation principle by further restricting the relationship of
two argumentation frameworks AF N AF ′. For this, we first introduce definitions of
non-cyclic attack sequences and attack cycles in the context of argumentation frameworks.
Definition 17 (Non-cyclic Attack Sequences in Argumentation Frameworks). A non-cyclic
attack sequence V in an argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks) is an argument
7. Lenient semantics can be considered to be too lax in that their aggregation of extensions through the
union of credulous semantics may combine extensions that contain arguments that do not fulfill the
semantics’ axioms (they are not conflict-free); this property is defined by Bench-Capon and Dunne as
“multiplicity” (Bench-Capon & Dunne, 2007) and is generally considered as problematic.
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sequence 〈a1, ..., an〉 such that (ai, ai+1) ∈ Attacks, ai ∈ AR, ai 6= aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 1 ≤ i ≤
n− 1. V(AF ) denotes all non-cyclic attack sequences of AF.
Note that the definition of a non-cyclic attack sequence is useful for a proof we provide
below.
Definition 18 (Attack Cycles in Argumentation Frameworks). An attack cycle C in an
argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks) is an argument sequence 〈a1, a2, ..., an−1, an〉
such that (ai, ai+1) ∈ Attacks, ai ∈ AR, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, a1 = an, and ∀(ai, ai+1), (aj , aj+1) ∈
C, i 6= j : (ai, ai+1) 6= (aj , aj+1). C(AF ) denotes all attack cycles of AF and ARC denotes
the arguments that occur in an attack cycle C.
Let us show how cycles are resolved by decision-making functions that use admissible
set-based semantics. We can proof that in admissible set-based extensions, all arguments of
an odd-length cycle that is not attacked from arguments outside the cycle are not returned
by the argumentation-based decision-making function.
Proposition 5. Let AF = (AR,Attacks) be an argumentation framework and let σ be an
admissible set-based semantics. If ∃c ∈ C(AF ), |c| mod 2 = 1 ∧ @a ∈ σy(AF ), y ∈ {∩,∪}
such that (a, b) ∈ Attacks ∧ b ∈ ARc, then ARc ∩ g ◦ σy = ∅.
Proof. We provide a proof by induction, where n is |AR|.
Base case: ARc = AR. If ARc = AR, then σy(AF ) = {}, by definition of an admissible
set.
Induction case: ARc 6= AR. If b ∈ AR \ ARc ∧ b ∈ σy(AF ) =⇒ (b, a) 6∈ Attacks. It
follows that all cycles in c ∈ C(AF ) can be resolved as shown in the base case.
In the case of any even-length cycle that is not attacked from arguments outside the
cycle, an argumentation-based decision-making function that takes the intersection of ad-
missible set-based semantics does not return any arguments within the cycle.
Proposition 6. Let AF = (AR,Attacks) be an argumentation framework and let σ be an
admissible set-based semantics. If ∃c ∈ C(AF ), |c| mod 2 = 0 ∧ @a ∈ σ∩(AF ) such that
(a, b) ∈ Attacks ∧ b ∈ ARc, then ARc ∩ g ◦ σ∩ = ∅.
Proof. We provide a proof by induction, where n is |AR|.
Base case: ARc = AR. If ARc = AR, then σ∩(AF ) = {}, by definition of an admissible
set.
Induction case: ARc 6= AR. If b ∈ AR \ ARc ∧ b ∈ σ∩(AF ) =⇒ (b, a) 6∈ Attacks. It
follows that all cycles c ∈ C(AF ) can be resolved as shown in the base case.
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Let us observe that in contrast, an argumentation-based decision-making function that
takes the union of complete, preferred, stable, semi-stable semantics returns all arguments
within the cycle. These results provide further indications that cycles are at the core of the
problem of reference dependent argumentation.
Now, we define the concept of a non-cyclic expansion.
Definition 19 (Non-Cyclic Expansion). A non-cyclic expansion of two argumentation
frameworks AF = (AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) (denoted by AF NC AF ′) is
an expansion AF E AF ′, for which it holds true that C(AF ′) = C(AF ).
This allows us to define the rational man’s expansion.
Definition 20 (Rational Man’s Expansion). A rational man’s argumentation expansion of
two argumentation frameworks AF and AF ′ (denoted by AF RM AF ′) is an expansion
AF E AF ′, for which the following conditions hold:
1. AF N AF ′;
2. AF NC AF ′.
We provide the following proposition–our assumption that the rational man’s expansion
guarantees reference independence.
Proposition 7. Let gi◦σyx be an argumentation-based choice function with x ∈ {complete,
preferred, semi− stable, stage, stage2, CF2, grounded, ideal, eager},
y ∈ {∩,∪}. Let AF = (AR,Attacks) and AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′) be argumentation frame-
works, with AF RM AF ′. The following statement holds true:
gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR =⇒ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) = gi ◦ σyx(AF )
Proof. We provide a proof by contradiction. We proof that the following statement does
not hold true:
gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR ∧ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6= gi ◦ σyx(AF )
Let us introduce the following observation:
Ifgi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR ∧ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6= gi ◦ σyx(AF )
=⇒ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ⊆ AR∧
(gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6⊆ gi ◦ σyx(AF )∨
gi ◦ σyx(AF ) 6⊆ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′))
In this observation, there are two cases:
1. If gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6⊆ gi ◦ σyx(AF ):
=⇒ ∃a ∈ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) ∧ a 6∈ gi ◦ σyx(AF ) ∧ a ∈ AR
=⇒ ∃〈b, ..., a〉 ∈ V(AF ′), b ∈ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′)
=⇒ ∃b ∈ AR′ \ AR, b ∈ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′)
=⇒ gi ◦ σyx(AF ′) 6⊆ AR. This is a contradiction.
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(a) AF ; gi ◦ σ(AF ) =
{a}.
a
b c
d
(b) AF ′; gi ◦ σ(AF ) =
{}
Figure 4: Importance of absence of even-length cycles. AF 6RM AF ′.
2. If gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ) 6⊆ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′):
=⇒ ∃a ∈ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ) ∧ a 6∈ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) ∧ a ∈ AR
=⇒ ∃〈b, ..., a〉 ∈ V(AF ′), b ∈ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′)
=⇒ ∃b ∈ AR′ \ AR, b ∈ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′)
=⇒ gi ◦ σ∪x (AF ′) 6⊆ AR. This is a contradiction.
In the context of the proof, it is worth noting that by definition, for stage2 and CF2
semantics, given AF NC AF ′, it holds for any SCCAF ′ , SCCAF ′ 6∈ AF that |SCCAF ′ | = 1,
i.e. any strongly connected component that is in AF ′ and not in AF consists of exactly
one argument.
Let us note that allowing for expansions that add even cycles to an argumentation frame-
work cannot guarantee reference independence in the case of many skeptical semantics. For
example, given AF = ({a, b}, {(a, b)}) and its expansion AF ′ = ({a, b, c, d}, {(a, b), (b, c),
(c, d), (d, a)}, grounded, ideal, and eager semantics, as well as skeptical complete, preferred,
semi-stable, stage, stage2, and CF2 semantics return {{a}} for AF and {{}} for AF ′,
as depicted in Figure 4. Also, it is not sufficient that only cycles that include at least
one argument Arg ∈ AR and at least one argument Arg ∈ AR′ \ AR are not allowed
in an expansion AF NC AF ′. This can be shown by introducing the following exam-
ple. Given AF = ({a}, {}) and AF ′ = ({a, b, c, d}, {(b, a), (c, b), (d, c), (b, d)}), grounded,
ideal, and eager semantics, as well as skeptical complete, preferred, semi-stable, stage,
stage2, and CF2 semantics return {{A}} for AF and {{}} for AF ′,as depicted in Fig-
ure 5. Given the presented findings, it is obvious that if expansion and reduction (the
removal of arguments) of an argumentation framework are allowed in any argumentation
scenario, cycles should be avoided altogether. For example, the argumentation framework
AF = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)}) implies (among others) the preference {}  {a}. Re-
moving the argument c from AF gives us AF ′ = ({a, b}, {(a, b)}), with AF ′ N AF . As
AF ′ implies (among others) {a}  {}, the preferences implied by AF are inconsistent with
the preferences implied by AF ′.
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(a) AF ; gi ◦ σ(AF ) =
{a}.
a b
c d
(b) AF ′; gi ◦ σ(AF ) =
{}
Figure 5: Importance of absence of cycles among arguments Args ⊆ (AR′ \AR). AF 6RM
AF ′.
8. Rational Man’s Argumentation, Belief Revision, and Dialogues
To highlight the relevance of the presented research, this section provides examples that
illustrate how the newly established principles and expansions can be applied.
Example 6 (Single-agent choice). Let us assume we have a rational buyer agent A that
frequently (at different points in time {t0, ti, tn}) chooses which items to buy from a set of
products Sti using an argumentation-based choice function g as defined by Definition 13
8.
At point t0, A chooses from the set St0 = {p1, p2} by constructing and resolving the ar-
gumentation framework AFt0 = (St0 , {(p1, p2)}), i.e., A chooses {p1}. At point t1, A
can choose from St1 = {p1, p2, p3}. Now, assuming that A’s beliefs about p1 and p2 did
not change, A, as a rational decision-maker, must construct an argumentation framework
AFt1 = (St1 , Attackst1), with AFt0 NC AFt1. For example, Attackst1 must not equal
{(p1, p2}), (p2, p1)}), as then, AFt1 cannot be a normal expansion (and consequently not a
non–cyclic expansion). With the attacks {(p1, p2}), (p2, p3),
(p3, p1)}), AFt1 is a normal expansion, but not a non-cyclic expansion of AFt0 (see Fig-
ure 6). Im contrast, (St1 , {(p1, p2), (p3, p1), (p3, p2)}) is a non-cyclic expansion and hence
permitted. If A’s beliefs about p1 and/or p2 changed, any change in attack relations can be
permitted.
Example 7 (Argumentation dialoges). In a multi-agent scenario, let us assume we have a
decision-maker agent A1 that receives advise from a consultant agent A2. In this context,
A1 presents its argumentation framework AF = (AR,Attacks) to A2, who then proposes
changes by providing AF ′ = (AR′, Attacks′), with AF ′ being a normal expansion of AF
(AF N AF ′). Subsequently, A1 can accept or reject the changes. A2 can propose two
types of changes:
Set-expanding changes. A2 only shows A1 that additional options to choose from exist
and how these options should be integrated into the argumentation framework.
Belief-revising changes. A2 advises A1 to change its beliefs about the choice options
contained in AF and may in addition propose set-expanding changes.
8. g can make use of any semantics that fulfill the uniqueness principle.
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p1
(a) AFt0 ; g
i ◦ σ(AFt0) = {p1}.
p1 p2
p3
(b) AFt1 ; g
i◦σ(AFt1) = {}.
Figure 6: AFt0  AFt1 implies a belief update that affects the preference order between {}
and {p1}.
a
b c
(a) AF ; gi ◦ σ(AF ) = {b, c}.
a
b c
d e
f
(b) AF ′; gi ◦ σ(AF ′) = {b}.
Figure 7: AF N AF ′, but AF NC AF ′.
A2 might want to deceive A1 by proposing changes that A2 labels as set-expanding but that
are also belief-revising. For example, A1 presents the following argumentation framework
to A2:
AF = ({a, b, c}, {(b, a), (c, a)}))
Then, B proposes the following:
AF ′ = ({a, b, c, d, e, f}, {(b, a), (c, a), (d, c), (e, d)(f, e)(d, f)}))
If A2 labels this proposal as set-expanding, A2 is deceiving A1 to think that A1 is barely
considering new options and not revising the assessment of the existing options. However,
given the work presented above, A1 can easily detect that AF RM AF ′ (AF NC AF ′).
Figure 7 depicts the argumentation graphs of AF and AF ′.
Example 8 (Argument Mining). The ability to assess the economic rationality, and in
particular reference independence, of argumentation frameworks can potentially be useful in
argument mining scenarios, in which argumentation graphs are generated from natural lan-
guage text (Lippi & Torroni, 2016). Let us introduce a scenario where an argument miner
uses machine learning techniques for natural language processing to generate argumentation
frameworks from text–for example, from legal documents–and then hands them over to an
agent that resolves the argumentation frameworks to inform its decision-making. However,
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Figure 8: Labeling Reference-dependent Argumentation Graphs to improve Argument Min-
ing.
the argumentation agent is not accepting the frameworks under any condition; instead, it is
assessing the frameworks and their relation with each other to determine if conditions of eco-
nomic rationality are infringed. The argumentation agent then provides the results of these
assessments to the argument miner, who can use the information in different ways. It can
either re-assess the corresponding text and suggest an alternative, economically rational in-
terpretation, or consider the text as not useful and label it accordingly to increase its ability to
focus on more useful texts in the future. Figure 8 depicts the architecture of the proposed sys-
tem. As an example, let us assume the argument miner creates argumentation frameworks
based on an evolving online discussion on whether a policy should be implemented or not (de-
noted by argument p). At time t0 the argument miner detects an argument a that attacks the
policy implementation proposal: AF0 = ({p, a}, {(a, p)}). The argumentation agent–using,
for example, skeptical complete semantics σ∩complete–resolves AF to {a}, i.e., it decides the
policy should not be implemented. At time t1, the argument miner detects the additional
arguments b and c, as well as the additional attack relations (a, b), (b, c), and (c, a). The
argumentation agent resolves the framework AF1 = ({p, a, b, c}, {(a, p), (a, b), (b, c), (c, a)})
as {}. Now, it is clear that AF0 N AF1, whereas AF0 6RM AF1. It is also clear that the
preference implied by g◦sigma∩complete(AF0) and g◦sigma∩complete(AF0) are inconsistent, i.e.,
gi ◦ sigmacapcomplete(AF0) =⇒ {a}  {} and gi ◦ sigma∩complete(AF1) =⇒ {}  {a}. Hence,
the argumentation agent can label AF1 as faulty or not useful and provide this information
to the argument miner, who can then attempt to find alternative formal interpretations of
the discussion, or move on to a different discussion. Figure 9 depicts the argumentation
graphs of AF0 and AF1.
9. Related Work: Preference-based Argumentation and Rational Man’s
Expansions
In our work, we derive implicit preferences from Dung-style argumentation frameworks.
Consequently, it makes sense to put our work in the context of argumentation approaches
that explicitly define preferences. Amgoud’s and Cayrol’s preference-based argumenta-
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p
a
(a) AF0; g
i ◦ σ∩complete(AF0) =
{a}.
p
a b
c
(b) AF1; g
i ◦ σ∩complete(AF1) =
{}.
Figure 9: AF0 N AF1, but AF0 NC AF1.
tion (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002) can be considered the most foundational work that advances
this research direction. Hence, we relate our work to preference-based argumentation and
confirm the intuition that the explicit definition of preferences does not guarantee rational-
ity by formal proof. Let us first introduce a definition of a preference-based argumentation
framework.
Definition 21 (Preference-based Argumentation Framework). (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002)
A preference-based argumentation framework is a triplet (AR,Attacks, Prefs), whereby
AR and Attacks are arguments and attack relations, defined according to Definition 4 and
Prefs define a partial or total ordering over AR×AR.
In a preference-based argumentation framework, acceptability is determined as follows.
Definition 22 (Preference-based Argumentation Framework). (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002)
Given a preference argumentation framework AFp = (AR,Attacks, Prefs), the set of ac-
ceptable arguments Argsacc ⊆ AR is determined as follows by the preference-based argu-
mentation function τpref :
τpref (AF ) = {a ∈ AR|∀b ∈ AR if(b, a) ∈ Attacks then a  b}
To analyze preference-based argumentation in the context of reference independence,
let us first define the concept of a normal expansion of a preference-based argumentation
framework.
Definition 23. An expansion AF ′p = (AR′, Attacks′, P refs′) of an argumentation frame-
work AF = (AR,Attacks, Prefs) is normal (AFp NP AF ′p) iff:
• ∀a, b : ((a, b) ∈ Attacks′ → a ∈ AR′ \AR ∨ b ∈ AR′ \AR) and
• ∀((a  b) ∈ Prefs→ (a  b) ∈ Prefs′) and
• ∀a, b : ((a  b) ∈ Prefs′ \ Prefs→ a ∈ AR′ \AR ∨ b ∈ AR′ \AR).
In words, considering the addition of preferences Prefs to Dung-style argumentation
frameworks, we assume that a normal expansion AF ′p of AFp does neither change existing
preferences defined in Prefs nor add additional preferences between any two arguments
that exist in AFp. Normal and non-cyclic expansions do not require a definition that is
specific to preference-based argumentation.
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a
b c
(a) AFp, with preferences (a 
c, b  c); gi◦τpref (AF ) = {a, c}.
a
b c
d
(b) AF ′p, with prefer-
ences (a  c, b  c, d 
c); gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) =
{c}.
Figure 10: Normal, but cyclic expansion: AFp NP AF ′p, but AFp NC AF ′p.
Now, it can be easily shown that preference-based argumentation does not guarantee
reference independence. For this, we introduce the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let AFp and AF
′
p be argumentation frameworks, with AFp = (AR,Attacks, Prefs),
AF ′p = (AR′, Attacks′, P refs′), and AFp NP AF ′p. Let gi◦τpref be an argumentation-based
choice function that uses preference-based argumentation. The following holds true:
gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = gi ◦ τpref (AFp)
Proof. The proposition can be proven by contra-example. We introduce the following
preference-based argumentation frameworks:
• AFp = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b)}, (a  c, b  c)});
• AF ′p = ({a, b, c, d}, {(a, b), (b, d), (d, a)}, (a  c, b  c, d  c))}.
We can see that AFp NP AF ′p. gi ◦ τpref resolves the frameworks as follows:
1. gi ◦ τpref (AFp) = {a, c}.
2. gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = {c}.
From gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) ⊆ AR and gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) 6= gi ◦ τpref (AFp) it follows that gi ◦
τpref (AF
′
p) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = gi ◦ τpref (AFp).
Figure 10 depicts the argumentation frameworks used in the proof.
Also, it can be proven that even when AF ′p is a normal, non-cyclic expansion of AFp
(AFp NP AF ′p, AFp NC AF ′p), reference dependence is not guaranteed.
Proposition 9. Let AFp and AF
′
p be argumentation frameworks, with AFp = (AR,Attacks,
Prefs), AF ′p = (AR′, Attacks′, P refs′), and AFp NP AF ′p, AFp NC AF ′p. Let gi ◦ τpref
be any argumentation-based choice function that uses preference-based argumentation. The
following holds true:
gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = gi ◦ τpref (AFp)
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a
b c
(a) AFp, with preferences (a 
c, b  c); gi ◦ τpref (AFp) =
{a, c}.
a
b c
d
(b) AF ′p, with prefer-
ences (a  c, b  c, d 
c)); gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) =
{c}.
Figure 11: Normal, non-cyclic expansion: AFp NP AF ′p, but AFp NC AF ′p.
Proof. Again, the proposition can be proven by contra-example. We introduce the following
preference-based argumentation frameworks:
• AFp = ({a, b, c}, {(a, b)}, (a  c, b  c)});
• AF ′p = ({a, b, c, d}, {(a, b), (c, d), (d, a)}, (a  c, b  c, d  c))}.
We can see that AFp NP AF ′p and AFp NC AF ′p. gi ◦ τpref resolves the frameworks as
follows:
1. gi ◦ τpref (AFp) = {a, c}.
2. gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = {c}.
From gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) ⊆ AR and gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) 6= gi ◦ τpref (AFp) it follows that gi ◦
τpref (AF
′
p) ⊆ AR 6=⇒ gi ◦ τpref (AF ′p) = gi ◦ τpref (AFp).
The argumentation frameworks used in the proof are depicted by Figure 11. It is clear
that preference-based argumentation complies with the principle, givenAFp = (AR,Attacks,
Prefs), AF ′p = (AR′, Attacks′, P refs′), and AFp NP AFp and given that Pref and Pref ′
are strict total orderings. In this case, the preferences over arguments override their attacks
relation and render the attack relations meaningless. As preference-based argumentation is
a special case of value-based argumentation as introduced by Bench-Capon (Bench-Capon,
2003), it is also clear normal, non-cyclic expansions cannot guarantee rationality for value-
based argumentation.
10. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper shows that abstract argumentation semantics typically do not guarantee a ra-
tional choice process according to the rational man paradigm and consequently uncovers a
gap between abstract argumentation semantics and economically rational choice. Thereby,
our research focuses on foundational work at the intersection of abstract argumentation
and (bounded) economic rationality. While semantics typically do not comply with rational
man’s argumentation principles that this paper establishes, the defined notion of a rational
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man’s argumentation expansion allows to ensure rationality in the context of argumentation-
based choice functions that use Dung-style semantics. Our work provides answers to the
question to what extent and under which circumstances the application of abstract argu-
mentation returns “reasonable” results from a practical perspective, in particular from the
perspective of economic rationality. Taking into account the rich body of formal works on
both argumentation and (boundedly) rational choice, plenty of opportunities to extend our
work exist. In particular, we consider the following research directions as promising future
work:
• ’Loop-busting’ to ensure economic rationality in temporal argumentation.
In this paper, we have shown that Dung-style argumentation approaches are typi-
cally economically not rational when considering the normal expansion of argumen-
tation frameworks and that economic rationality–i.e. reference independence–can be
achieved by avoiding the addition of cycles in normal expansions. However, it can be
assumed that many scenarios require well-defined approaches to handling argumen-
tation cycles in an economically rational (reference independent) manner. To devise
such approaches, it should be possible to build on a fundament of works on the reso-
lution of cycles in argumentation graphs (also called ’loop-busting’) (Baroni, Gabbay,
& Giacomin, 2014).
• Economic rationality and advanced argumentation frameworks.
In addition to preference-based and value-based argumentation, a range of other
works extends Dung’s notion of an argumentation framework, for example by assign-
ing weights or intervals to attack relations (e.g., probabilistic (Li, Oren, & Norman,
2011) and possibilistic (Nieves & Confalonieri, 2011) argumentation). Given that the
rational man’s expansion as established in this paper does not guarantee reference
independence in the case of preference-/value-based argumentation, the exploration
of the intersection of these approaches and economic rationality can be considered
promising future research.
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Appendix. Uniqueness in Argumentation Semantics
In addition to showing which argumentation-based choice functions comply with the clear
preferences property, we provide an overview of which argumentation semantics can fulfill
this property by themselves, without the need of aggregation by g∪ or g∩. We refer to
semantics with this behavior as semantics that fulfill the uniqueness principle. By providing
examples that return ambiguous results (i.e. more than one extension of a specific semantics
for the same argumentation framework), it can be easily proven by example that complete,
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Table 1: Overview: compliance with the uniqueness principle.
Credulous (σ(AF )) Skeptical (σ∩(AF )) Lenient (σ∪(AF ))
Complete No Yes Yes
Grounded Yes - -
Preferred No Yes Yes
Stable No No No
Ideal Yes - -
Semi-stable No Yes Yes
Eager Yes - -
Stage No Yes Yes
CF2 No Yes Yes
Stage2 No Yes Yes
preferred, stable, semi-stable, eager, and stage semantics do not comply with the uniqueness
principle.
Proposition 10. The following semantics do not comply with the uniqueness principle:
complete semantics, preferred semantics, stable semantics9, semi-stable semantics, and
stage semantics.
Proof. Let us introduce the argumentation framework AF1 = ({A,B}, {(A,B),
(B,A)}). When applying any of the semantics listed in Proposition 10, AF1 has two exten-
sions: {A} and {B}.
Grounded semantics comply with the uniqueness principle. To assert this, one can
rely on Dung’s proof that any argumentation framework has exactly one grounded ex-
tension (Dung, 1995). For ideal semantics, the proof that every argumentation frame-
work has exactly one (ideal) extension is provided by Caminada and Pigozzi (Caminada &
Pigozzi, 2011); the same is proven for eager semantics by Caminada (Caminada, 2007). By
definition–because they are defined as the union and intersection, respectively, of all exten-
sions an argumentation framework has, given a specific semantics–all lenient and skeptical
variants of semantics that always provide at least one extension are unambiguous and hence
fulfill the uniqueness principle; i.e., all skeptical and lenient semantics with the exception
of stable semantics comply with the uniqueness principle10.
9. Indeed, as shown by Dung, some argumentation frameworks do not have any stable extension (Dung,
1995).
10. Stable semantics are an exception here because they are not universally defined, i.e. there exist argu-
mentation frameworks, for which no stable extension can be defined (Baroni et al., 2018).
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